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THE EDUCATION OF PROFESSOR (AND
ASSOCIATE DEAN MORE OR LESS
EMERITUS) ROBERT L. FLETCHER
Charles Corker*
When teaching law to students is to be done, the professor's lot is not
a happy one.
W.S. Gilbert did not write those lines, but he inspired them. More
accurate than his, they describe the attitude of most law teachers
toward classroom tasks since shortly after 1870 when Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell introduced the case method of instruction at
Harvard Law School. The only task law professors find more onerous
is reading and grading examination books.
Happily, there are exceptions. Robert L. Fletcher is the most striking exception I have known. He appears to enjoy reading examination
papers. He even quotes short passages to his traveling companions
while enjoying the sunshine of a Mexican resort during winter break.
That two of his four children-Susan Fletcher French and William A.
Fletcher-have followed their father into law teaching at U.C.L.A.
and Berkeley, respectively, suggests that Bob's unusual trait may be
genetic. That might be impossible to verify, unfortunately, if my
memory of Biology 101 is accurate. Geneticists need at least one
whole bottle full of fruit flies to draw any conclusion. Assembling a
bottle full of law professors would be both difficult and inhumane.
I think that Bob's attitude toward teaching law stems from his education, and that theory is the thesis of these pages. First, however, one
must understand why law professors find their heaviest lifting in the
classroom. The reason is inherent in the nature of law itself.
Jurisprudence and legal philosophy are rich with competing definitions of law, but most law students starting out find these word of
Justice Holmes, delivered to law students, adequate to describe what
they expect to be taught: "The prophecies of what the courts will do
in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."1
The shining, eager faces of each first-year law class in September glow
*

Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law.

1. Holmes, The Path of the Law," 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897). Holmes has been
criticized, as have law teachers who defend his definition, because he leaves out things like justice
and morality. He did so intentionally. If law and morality do not coincide, is it a judge's task to
follow the latter and disregard the former? Holmes thought not.
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with expectation that the professor will impart knowledge for the open
notebooks that will prepare students after less than three years to set
themselves up in the business of making such prophecies. By
Thanksgiving, however, the glow of eagerness fades, like most of the
flowers. By May, eyes are heavy lidded. Attendance is mediocre to
poor, and even faithful class attenders are often absent in spirit. If
there is improvement by May of the third year, it is because of relief
that the law school experience is about to end.
There are a few weary or incompetent law professors, but no sadists.
No one enjoys disappointing students who arrive bright, young, and
eager, but are graduated weary, dispirited, and cynical. But since
Langdell, not many law professors have found a good alternative.
Nearly fifty years after his graduation, Franklin G. Fessenden recalled the consternation and travail in Fessenden's class to which Langdell had introduced the first casebook--one in contracts. 2 That
casebook was not, given the earlier invention of the printing press, a
startling innovation. Rather, it was and is the only way to enable a
large group of students to prepare for class by reading the same appellate opinions. But reading and analyzing judicial opinions is hard
work, sometimes dull work, and not what law students at Harvard or
elsewhere had been accustomed to do.
Langdell's problem, and that of all law teachers who have used
casebooks, has never been solved to student satisfaction. Unsatisfied
students lead to dissatisfied professors, and never ending experiments
to find a better solution to Langdell's problem. The problem: once
students have read the authoritative judicial sources of the law, what
task is left to the teacher?
Langdell emulated Socrates. He did to students what Socrates did
to Alcibiades. When Alcibiades gave a dumb answer, Socrates pursued him with further questions, demonstrating that Alcibiades was,
at best, slow. Students, who knew that Alcibiades was slow, rapidly
grew restless. They had not paid tuition to listen to an Alcibiades.
Worse, students became convinced that Langdell, although apparently
a gentle fellow like Socrates, did not know the answers to his own
questions. In fact, if Langdell's questions were worth the time spent
on them, students were right.3 Students flocked to classes taught by
2. Fessenden, The Rebirth of the HarvardLaw School, 33 HARV. L. REV. 493, 498-90 (1920).
3. This point is mine, not Fessenden's, who would have disagreed with me: "[Langdell's]
mind recoiled from temporizing or avoiding the real issue. He sought only the true solution, and
when he had arrived at a conclusion, whether with reference to his method of teaching or dealing
with a law question, he adhered to it tenaciously, even in the face of apparent pecuniary loss to
the School or severe condemnation for himself ....
His earnest endeavor was to lead his pupils
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professors who clearly did know the law, and who did not harass them
with questions. Langdell's attendance fell to seven or eight students.
Law school enrollment fell to the lowest point since Civil War years.
The teaching force fell to two professors, one of whom had resigned.
Langdell had character, however, and also the strong support of
President Charles W. Eliot. Eliot had persuaded the law professors to
elect Langdell, who came with a notion of a new way to teach, as
dean.4 Once under way, Langdell was deaf to all proposals and
entreaties that he water down his Socratic style. Fessenden recalled
that the end of the furor began when word reached Cambridge from as
far as San Francisco that law firms had found that graduates educated
by Langdell's method came with more highly honed skills than those
who had "read law" while apprenticed to a lawyer, or who had only
listened to lectures about law at another school. Langdell was not
required to drink hemlock.
Failing eyesight reportedly forced Langdell to turn to lecturing in
his later years.5 I find this hard to understand, however, because ability to read is all but indispensable however one teaches. I suspect that
Langdell, like other law teachers I have known, grew weary of disappointing students who expect to be told some law, and to be asked one
question to which a clear answer is at least possible. I have not seen
Langdell's first edition of cases on contracts, but his second edition
contains his outline-longer than the overpriced commercial outlines
which students in our time cling to as security blankets.
A law school without casebooks is probably now impossible to find.
Socrates, however, has largely disappeared from classrooms. Students
willing to play Alcibiades can almost never be found. Some colleagues
I have known substitute the "expert method." A student appointed as
the day's expert reads the assigned material. A dialogue with the
expert is not Socratic, but it relieves the monotony of professor and
students listening for fifty minutes to the same droning voice. No
teacher I have known to use the expert method brags about it. Is it
possible that Alcibiades was Socrates' appointed fall guy, for whom
to be as unerring as possible in their search for the truth .... [He felt [law] could be resolved
into comparatively few absolute rules." Fessenden, supra note 2, at 505-506.
Fessenden, and probably Langdell, believed that the law has right answers. Professors today
are not nearly as dogmatic.
4. Eliot, Langdell and the Law School, 33 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1920), described after fifty
years his recollection of how he persuaded first the Harvard Corporation and then the Board of
Overseers to elect Langdell as Dane Professor, and finally the law faculty to name him as its
dean. "The intervention of the President in any Law School proceedings was... unexampled"
and "awkward." Id. at 519.
5. Fessenden, supra note 2, at 514.

275

Washington Law Review

Vol. 65:273, 1990

Socrates obtained a work-study grant to help serve his pedagogical
purpose and to make Socrates look good?
There is nothing wrong with lecturing, particularly if the subject
matter is something other than law. (Opening up on a history class,
prepared or unprepared, with "what do you think about the Battle of
Hastings" would not be a good idea.) Lecturers may be comforted
that a more influential teacher than Socrates apparently lectured:
"and when he was set, his disciples came unto him and he opened his
mouth saying ... "6 Jesus proceeded to give the Sermon on the
Mount in three closely packed chapters of scripture.
Jesus, however, was teaching matters of faith to those already his
disciples. The brightest first-year law student, exposed to a reading of
those chapters for the first time, could not carry much away, either in
his head or his notebook. Such students have nothing to remember
and apply to a hypothetical examination problem several months later.
We who have lectured about law from time to time have learned this.
Unless appearances deceive, Bob Fletcher is little concerned with
techniques of pedagogy. Facing a class, he does what comes naturally.
Justifiably he prides himself in the clarity, the accuracy, the syntax,
and the simplicity of his prose. He does not heal the sick, raise the
dead, or walk on water. He covers the planned subject matter in
orderly fashion. And he treats students, as he treats everyone else,
with attention and respect. He does not hide the ball. Unlike Langdell, if asked his personal view he provides it. But he forces that view
on no one. None of his students has ever asked a stupid question.
Bob learned his skill with language early. His father was a public
school principal who died early, but after somehow transmitting to
Bob a deep respect for language. Bob was raised by maiden aunts, and
has never learned to swear, either at students or at colleagues, no matter what the provocation. This is a pity. He tolerates, but I fear with
some pain, friends who do swear. Tolerance is good.
More unusual among law professors is Bob's undergraduate engineering education at Stanford. Engineers are applied scientists who
plan and design things. They crunch numbers. They are expected to
know about how much the designed building will cost. In recent
years, Bob has built a house with his own two hands.
His education as a young engineer led to a naval career that taught
him both confidence and humility. Confidence came when Admiral
Rosendahl, the Navy's one and only lighter-than-air Admiral, reached
down and made the young ensign, just after he had learned to fly a
6. Matthew 5:1-2 (King James).
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blimp, his personal staff collaborator to design gear which would make
the Navy's K-type airship an effective weapon to kill submarines
under water.
Collaboration with an admiral was itself a lesson in humility.
Admiral Rosendahl, a true believer in LTA, expected that after the
war skies would be filled with fleets of helium-filled airships carrying
the commerce of the world more cheaply than surface ships or heavier-than-air craft. The collaborator with an all powerful man of such
vision necessarily learns tact. He also learns how to do the impossible,
and to give credit for success to the man with the most braid.
The whole lighter-than-air-force-including Bob and the Admirallearned humility in 1943 when, at long last, an American Navy blimp
and a German submarine met each other in Florida waters and joined
in combat. The blimp lost. A few weeks later I was assigned by the
Navy Supply Corps to duty with a blimp squadron in Florida. On
almost the first day, I stood at attention and watched the rescued survivors (only one man died) of the blimp's crew receive the Purple
Heart in token of their hours of trauma awaiting rescue in shark-filled
waters. The command pilot of the blimp, had he followed approved
procedure, would have stayed out of range of the sub's deck gun so
long as the sub remained on the surface, and radioed for help. He was
immediately assigned to duty with LTA's administrative headquarters. After the war he became a professor of law in Indiana.
I did not see this man again until 1965, when I first met Bob
Fletcher as a teaching colleague. Bob confirmed the details of the
humiliation of the entire blimp Navy. Bob and the Admiral would
have solved the problem if the war had lasted longer, and if the Admiral had continued to get the same support in new blimps, men, and
materials that had been available before 1943. The difficulty was in
airship design. The blimp's single machine gun could keep the sub's
deck gun inoperative while approaching the sub, but after the blimp
flew over the sub it could not shoot backwards or turn quickly and the
gas bag became a helpless artillery target.
Adding a machine gun at the rear to shoot backwards was a problem the Admiral and Bob never solved. A rear machine gun would
have shot the blimp's lower tail fin, indispensable to navigation. A few
years after the war the Navy mothballed the last blimp.
I do not know why Bob abandoned his engineering career to study
law after the war, but I suspect that frustration over, the failure of the
helium Navy-which even a junior command officer felt-had something to do with it. At any rate, on graduation from Stanford Law
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School, Bob and his growing family moved to Puget Sound. Bob practiced law and made the family bread-literally and metaphorically.
Betty Binns Fletcher, of Tacoma, who had started that family in blimp
days at Lakehurst, New Jersey, enrolled at the University of Washington Law School and-with Bob's help in the bread and diaper departments-graduated at the head of her class. Then, continuing to raise
the family, she joined one of the largest and most prestigious law firms
in Seattle identified by a string of names, the last of which by 1979 was
Fletcher.
Betty's reputation was such as to create speculation at that time that
soon the firm would be Fletcher, followed by a string of names. But
President Carter appointed her to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. In legal circles with which I communicate most
often, the Supreme Court wins praise when it affirms one of her opinions. When it reverses her, heads shake in disbelief. Disbelief usually
becomes conviction as soon as the dissents become available to read.
Bob has never been heard to seek for himself a word of praise or to
accept one in criticism related to any of Betty's achievements. Nevertheless it is clear that, whatever his effect on her education, hers has
been of the greatest importance to him. As a student and in practice
she was a window on the real world-of greatest value to a professor
of property whose academic focus is likely to be events of the fifteenth
century or earlier.
Since Betty has been a judge, her influence on Bob's continuing education is harder to appraise. Clearly, however, his reputation has been
enhanced. Who can better be expected to prophesy accurately about
what a court will do than a judge's spouse? Who would know the
legal system better than the spouse of a judge of distinction like Betty
Fletcher?
Fortunately, the legal subject on which Bob speaks with greatest
authority does not often arise in a federal court. That is the Rule
Against Perpetuities, which says that the dead hand of a grantor, devisor, or settlor cannot leave title to property unvested beyond lives in
being plus twenty-one years. Before Bob first published on this subject
the conventional academic wisdom approved invalidating dispositions
in their entirety because of the possibility that an interest might vest in
a child yet to be born to an eighty-year-old widow, or in the unborn
spouse of a now ninety-year-old bachelor.
Bob has carefully exorcised the irrationalities from the rule, but so
far has attracted little notice from those who continue to teach,
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preach, and restate the rule in its weirdest form. 7 The reason? Bob is
not a polemicist. He shrinks from attacking an adversary, just as he
never suggests that a student is unprepared or stupid. But Bob is of
good cheer and of continually good disposition. He knows, I think,
that if our world survives at all, his legacy to rationality will some day
prevail.
By accident or cosmic design, the education of Bob Fletcher produced a great teacher. But that education could not be replicated,
even if we could order a repetition of World War II. Clearly, however, the end product of that education is more than worth searching
for the elements that can be replicated.
Bob is not waiting for his reward in heaven. The first semester after
retirement, so-called, he taught Property at Hastings, in San Francisco. The next semester, as I write, he is teaching Property at the
University of Vermont. Near Puget Sound his friends, colleagues, former students, neighbors, and family hope that he may soon tire of this,
and that he will not stop en route to tidy up the law of property in
Illinois or in North Dakota.
Bob, your disciples are waiting for you!

7. Fletcher, Perpetuities: Basic Clarity, Muddled Reform, 63 WASH. L. REV. 791 (1988);
Fletcher, A Rule ofDiscrete Invalidity: PerpetuitiesReform Without Waiting, 20 STAN. L. REV.
459 (1968).
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